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CASTE AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS:
FROM JIM CROW TO SAME-SEX

MARRIAGES
Richard A. Epstein*
The battle over civil rights law has been waged on many different fronts at the same time. Historically, the emphasis has been on
the manifest injustices that dominant groups have inflicted on other
groups with less political power. Economically, the dispute has
been over whether civil rights legislation will increase or reduce
overall levels of production. Sociologically, the question has been
whether civil rights legislation can overcome hierarchy and foster a
sense of community among equals, or whether it increases levels of
group consciousness, which in turn leads to issues of group
separation.
In most modern settings, this search for rationales has not
stemmed from any doubt about the wisdom or even the necessity of
civil rights laws. Quite the opposite, the desirability of these laws is
usually taken for granted, and the inquiry then proceeds with the
aim of finding the most powerful intellectual base on which these
laws can rest. But the evident increase in racial and ethnic conflict
and the massive attention to sex differences or gender relations even the terms used in the debate will say a lot about which side an
advocate is on' - show that the old confidence about the desirability of these laws has been shaken by an ever-increasing awareness
that things have not turned out quite the way the supporters of civil
rights legislation had hoped.
That sense of disappointment is evident in the disagreement
over fundamental objectives. On the one hand, commentators
commonly proclaim that the purpose of civil rights legislation is to
make institutions and individuals ignore those differences of race
* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
A.B. 1964, Columbia; B.A. 1966, Oxford; LL.B. 1968, Yale. - Ed. I should like to thank
Elena Kagan and Michael McConnell for their immensely helpful (because critical) comments on an earlier version of this essay, and Isaac Barchas for his usual splendid research
assistance.
1. For a recent overview, see Alan Wolfe, The Gender Question, NEw REPUBLIC, June 6,

1994, at 27 (reviewing SANDRA L. BEM, THE LENSES OF GENDER: TRANSFORMING THE
DEBATE ON SEXUAL INEQUALITY (1993), HELEN W. HAsTE, THE SEXUAL METAPHOR
(1994), and JUDITH LORBER, PARADOXES OF GENDER (1994)).
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and sex that are morally irrelevant from a proper point of view. 2
That line of argument works well when the question is whether
someone from a privileged class - usually, but not always, a white
male - should be allowed to indulge a "taste" for discrimination
against individuals who fall outside that preferred group. But the
language of moral irrelevance quickly disappears from view when
the question is whether affirmative action programs should redress
grievances against particular groups, or whether considerations of
diversity should permit -

or require -

institutions to take into

account matters of race or sex in order to obtain the proper internal
institutional balance, 3 independent of whether the individuals involved have been the targets of past discrimination. These two conceptions clash in uncomfortable ways and have led to a certain
amount of bobbing and weaving in an effort to justify state-imposed
preferences that to the undiscerning eye may look like forms of reverse discrimination, all for motives that could vary from lofty to
suspect, depending on the interlocutor's point of view.
The utter ambivalence over the nature and justification of civil
rights laws is not easily remedied, and perhaps we should not even
try to supply the needed rationalizations. I have stated as openly,
forcefully, and frequently as I can: these laws should be repealed as
quickly as possible to the extent that they regulate the behavior of
private parties in competitive employment markets, and indeed in
other competitive markets, such as education and housing. 4 The
point of this argument is that open markets can allow separate and
distinct institutions to forge their own policies on discrimination.
Burning questions of diversity and affirmative action need no
longer be collective issues, and governments do not have to decide,
2. The most systematic and thorough application of the caste principle to modem questions of race and sex discrimination is Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle,92 MICH. L.
REV. 2410 (1994) (this issue), which ably presents a defense of the caste principle to which
this article is in part a response.
3. Judith Lorber, it appears, argues for "scrupulous gender equality," meaning that 50%

of the employees in each job category should be male and 50% should be female. See
LORBER, supranote 1, at 298; see also Wolfe, supra note 1, at 32. Lorber cares not a 1, at 298;

see also Wolfe, supra note 1, at 32. Lorber cares not a whit for total output - which will fall
precipitously - or for individual freedom - which will disappear under the crush of government mandates.
4. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992). For subsequent elaborations, see Richard A. Epstein, Stand-

ing Firm, on Forbidden Grounds, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (1994) [hereinafter Epstein.
Standing Firm] (answering my many critics), and Richard A. Epstein, Why the Status Production Sideshow; or Why the AntidiscriminationLaws Are Still a Mistake, 108 HARV. L. REV.
(forthcoming Mar. 1995) (commenting on Richard McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The
Economics of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination,108 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 1995)).
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once and for all, whether they believe in color-blind rules, affirmative action, diversity, or strict proportionality, nor do they have to
do the mental gymnastics necessary to defend all these positions
simultaneously. Separate institutions can go their separate ways.
The overall level of social output should increase without the dangerous side effects and resentments that are brought on by ever
more intrusive forms of government regulation. More important,
perhaps, the truly powerful and insidious institutions of caste and
domination could not survive in a world in which the presumption
was set against the exercise of state power, the law of contracts enforced private bargains, the law of tort controlled private aggression, and public officials acted in a neutral and impartial fashion
toward all citizens in the protection of these private rights.
The usual response, however, has not been to give up on civil
rights laws but to find ways to imbue them with a new life and vitality. One way to achieve that goal is to create the kind of focus on
outrages and abuses that lent the movement its great moral power
in the years before 1964. It is, I think, not quite coincidence that
public television often replays the clips of Marion Anderson singing
"My Country 'Tis of Thee" on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial
and relives the early triumphs of Thurgood Marshall in Brown v.
Board of Education.5 It is a form of nostalgia that allows the rejuvenation of a social fabric grown weary with the travails of Benjamin Chavis. 6 More generally, the effort has been to show that the
evils of racism and sexism that we face today are, in more subtle
form, the same evils we have faced in times past. One way to
achieve that result is to claim that we have today, again in more
subtle form, the same kind of economic and social "caste" system
that operated in the Old South during the heyday of Jim Crow. The
social and legal barriers that are still in place prevent the emergence of the kind of social equality and economic competitiveness
that would render all forms of civil rights laws unwise and unnecessary. Until that equality emerges, some form of government action
is necessary to redress the injustices of the past and to restructure
the society of today.
I think that any effort to portray the current social situation as
the outgrowth of traditional castelike policies confuses the outgrowth of multiple and uncertain social forces with explicit legal
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
6. See Ellis Cose & Vern E. Smith, The Fall of Benjamin Chavis, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 29,
1994, at 27; Steven A. Holmes, After Ouster of Chavis, Uncertainty for N.A.A.C.P., N.Y.

TIMES, Aug. 28, 1994, § 4, at 2.
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distinctions. We must be aware of establishing formal distinctions
between persons, sanctioned and recognized by law - an establishment that helps to perpetuate the same rigid class distinctions that a
liberal society should seek to obviate. This result is evident in the
work of radical feminists who want to impose their own vision of a
just society on those who do not share their own beliefs and conviction. But it is also evident in the work of moderate institutions that
are not attentive to what those feminists do.
One illustration will have to suffice. The evolution of the 1964
Civil Rights Act7 shows how easy it is for castelike notions to creep
in through the back door of the very law that was designed to expel
them. The original text is the paragon of neutrality insofar as it
makes it unlawful for any employer - not all people or all employees - "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual.., because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 8 The studied effort of the section is to use impersonal language that speaks of
a universal obligation, the antithesis of caste. But in just one unthinking decision, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,9 the
Supreme Court changed the ground rules under the Act from universal to particularistic when it announced that any individual could
make out "a prima facie case of racial discrimination ... by showing
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants;
(iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that,
after his rejection, the position remained open."'10 But it is a whopping non sequitur to declare that only members of racial minorities
can be victims of racial discrimination under the statute, even if
such individuals are in fact more likely to be the targets of such
discrimination. The casual way in which the Supreme Court imposed formal restrictions on eligibility under the Civil Rights Act at
that first stage of the prima facie case shows how easy it is to introduce castelike distinctions into a law that a few short years before
had been dedicated to their elimination. From the use of protected
classes, it is only a short step to the idea of affirmative action,11
7. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6

(1988)).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).

9. 411 U.S. 792 (1973), criticized in EPsTEIN, supra note 4, at 167-81.
10. 411 U.S. at 802.
11. See David A. Strauss, Biology, Difference, and Gender Discrimination,41 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1007, 1019 (1992) (agreeing with my analysis that the use of protected classes and af-
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which adds the carrot to the stick and further reinforces the race
and sex distinctions the statute was designed to eliminate.
In this essay, therefore, I address the notion of caste in two separate contexts: in the traditional disputes over race and sex, and in
the more modem disputes over sexual orientation. In both cases
the idea of caste and its kindred notions of subordination and hierarchy are used to justify massive forms of government intervention.
In all cases I think that these arguments are incorrect. In their
place, I argue that the idea of caste should be confined to categories
of formal, or legal, distinctions between persons before the law.
This more limited notion of caste supplies no justification for the
enforcement of any civil rights law that purports to limit the freedom of association among individuals, whether their connections be
intimate and personal, economic and professional, or religious and
social. But by the same token, this limited conception mirrors the
older conception of civil rights law - a conception that restored to
individuals the capacity to contract and to form associations of their
own choosing.' 2 Judged by that standard, many laws on the books
today are illegitimate, limiting associational choice between individuals, as laws once did under Jim Crow in the South, or as the pretwentieth-century legal disabilities of women did. In particular, the
current prohibitions against same-sex marriages are themselves a
mistake - regardless of what one thinks of the wisdom or morality
of these marriages - and should be rejected as inimical to the basic
principle of freedom of association on which a liberal society should
rest. Rightly understood, the idea of caste works best when confined to its original understanding. The effort to expand that conception obscures the critical distinction between removing and
imposing state barriers to voluntary associations. The older, liberal
conception of civil rights law thus makes far more sense than its
modern competition.
I.

RACE AND SEX

The first effort to expand the notion of caste beyond its formal

base has been in the area of race relations. It is easy to denounce
the Jim Crow rules of the old South as the creation of a caste system insofar as the system had formal segregation in public schools,
explicit racial segregation on public transportation, and an explicit
firmative action are not significantly distinct, but reaching the opposite conclusion that both practices should be preserved).

that is,

12. For a longer discussion, see Richard A. Epstein, 7vo Conceptions of Civil Rights,

Soc. PHIL & PoL, Spring 1991, at 38,
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prohibition on racial intermarriage. Kenneth Karst, a champion of
the communitarian view, has stated this position well. 13 The Court
upheld these racial restrictions in Plessy v. Ferguson,14 and it took
not only Brown v. Board of Education'5 but a host of other deci-

sions to root out segregation in American life. 16 But the identification of these restrictions as abuses need not translate into a need for
big government. Quite the opposite - the removal of these restrictions is perfectly consistent with the program of a limited-state libertarian, an individualist to the core, who wholeheartedly
champions the civil rights movement to the extent that it allows all
persons the equal protection of the common law rules of property,
contract, and tort, and equal legal rights to vote and otherwise participate in public affairs. The first civil rights movement aimed to
assure the capacity of all persons to enter into voluntary transactions, to hold property, and to sue and be sued,' 7 and insofar as it
sought to create capacities and remove legal disabilities, it is an essential part of the liberal and individualist program to the same if
not greater extent than it is part and parcel of the modem civil
rights agenda.
The modern antidiscrimination norm requires each person
within a group to treat with equal respect all other persons, regardless of their race, creed, sex, religion, or national origin. These principles are designed not to further the principle of freedom of
13. See Kenneth Karst, Equality and Community: Lessons from the Civil Rights Era, 56
NoTRE DAME LAW. 183,200-14 (1980); Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and CulturalIdentity, 64 N.C. L. REV. 303 (1986) [hereinafter Karst, Pathsto Belonging].

Karst writes:
Jim Crow illustrates the main technique of nativist domination: the enforced separation of members of the subordinate cultural group from a wide range of public and
private institutions that, in the aggregate, constitute "society." Racial segregation in the
American South was the successor to slavery and the Black Codes, both of which had
been decisively made unlawful by congressional legislation and the Civil War amend-

ments. In this historical context it is easy to see Jim Crow for what it was: a thoroughgoing program designed to maintain blacks as a group in the position of a subordinate
racial caste by means of a systematic denial of belonging.

Id. at 320-21.
14. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
15. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

16. See, e.g., Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (municipal airport restau-

rant); New Orleans City Park Improvement Assn. v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (parks);

Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (buses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879
(1955) (golf courses); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (beaches); see also
Karst, Paths to Belonging, supra note 13, at 323 n.136.
17. See Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982 (1988)) (addressing the right to hold property); Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16
Stat. 144 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988)), amended by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981(a)

to 1981(c) (Supp. V 1993) (addressing the right to enter into contracts and the right to sue
and be sued).
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association but to limit its scope, in effect, by requiring that certain
characteristics regarded as morally irrelevant by some general theory must be treated as irrelevant by all individuals in their private
decisions -

with the usual sting -

whether they like it or not. In

part this theory seeks to rely on the same set of instincts that led the
first wave of civil rights reform; it indicates that persons - notably
blacks and women - who have been treated as inferiors and subordinates in their economic or social status should be accorded the
special protection of the law. 8
Yet here there is a fatal flaw in the effort to link the formal
differences in legal status with the economic and social deprivations
that some groups suffer, or are said to suffer, in society - in effect,
to make disparate results in gross statistical analyses of economic
success analogous to caste. We should remember, though, that
caste is not a synonym for subpopulation. Caste means something

very specific - that is, a hereditary class structure. Thus my
Webster's gives as its first definition of caste a narrow one: "one of
the hereditary social classes in Hinduism."' 19 The stress on hereditary positions in a caste does not seem to transfer easily to the contemporary American environment, in which no formal structures except, of course, the civil rights laws - enforce social or economic
stratification based on inborn characteristics. This is especially true
in a world of racial intermarriage, and without some very sophisticated translation, the focus on hereditary positions makes no sense
at all with respect to distinctions between men and women.
Most importantly, however, castes are formal constructs that tie
explicit privileges to each discrete status. But there is no lockstep
connection between group identity and economic position. It is
possible for a group to be the target of legal discrimination and
subordination on the one hand and yet to be economically prosperous on the other. That was surely the case in the early years of the
Nazi regime for the Jews, who were at best second-class citizens,
and is the lot of many Indians who have left India and have settled
and worked in various African countries.
Any concern with economic differentials and disadvantages
should not blind us to the fact that first and foremost in any caste
system is the traditional concern with explicit legal differences in
capacities or entitlements based on the accidents of birth: race, sex,
18. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 2, at 2428-29.
19. WEBSTER'S

Nircrm

NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY

212 (1984). The more general

definition refers to "a division of society based on differences of wealth, inherited rank or

privilege, profession, or occupation." Id.
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religion, and national origin. The effort to find evidence of de facto
discrimination should not blind us to the obvious point that de jure,
explicit, and formal discriminations by the state are still the first
evil, whether or not they produce the economic inequalities with
which they are often, but not necessarily, associated. It is dangerous to pump up economic and social differences by using a word
that makes them sound like formal legal distinctions imposed by
operation of law and against the will of the parties so bound and
disadvantaged.
As one might expect, the economic data are balky as well. African Americans today do not do well by many of the standard measures of success. The United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) has constructed a human development index, incorporating three basic elements by which it rates various nations and
groups within nations: life expectancy at birth, education, and income.20 Under these measures the United States is said to rank
1
sixth behind Japan, Canada, Norway, Switzerland, and Sweden,2
though the differences among these nations are all trivially small,
with numbers ranging from 0.983 for Japan to 0.976 for the United
States.22 But the story is quite different when the divisions are
made by race. On that scale American whites move to first place
on the list, a small change given the defects in the basic index. But
American blacks receive a score of 0.875, which would place them
in thirty-second place on the list of nations, just behind Trinidad
and Tobago, while American Hispanics - including many recent
immigrants from Latin America, so the figure is systematically misleading - would rank thirty-fifth, just behind Estonia, with an index of around 0.87. 23 The data should surely give everyone pause.
20. UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1993, at 10,
104 (1993) [hereinafter HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT]. The Human Development Index
(HDI) ranges from 0.983 for Japan to 0.045 for Guinea; HDI scores are computed by subtracting a composite score - referred to as a nation's "average deprivation" - from 1. See
id. at 135-37, 100-01.
21. See id. at 135 tbl. 1.
22. The small differences relate to imperfections in the construction of the index. The
educational component, for example, takes into account basic literacy, which is at 99% for all
developed nations; mean years of schooling, which shows only little variation; and a literacy
index, which likewise is at 1.00 for the first 14 nations on the list. Id. at 100-01. There are
also only a few years' variation in life expectancy in the developed nations; the figure hovers
in the mid-70s for males and females born in 1990. Id. The major differences come in the
income figures, and these are subject to genuine difficulties in conversion in that the variations in standards of living do not track the higher volatility of exchange rates in a one-forone fashion. Id. at 106-07. The rankings at the top are therefore close to arbitrary and the
bunching effect is evidence, not of the closeness of these nations to each other, but of the
insensitivity of the variables chosen.
23. Id. at 18 figs. 1.12 & 1.13. The numbers are approximate, from the graph. It is also
striking that black females do far better than black men on the scale. The aggregate figures
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Nonetheless, to draw an inference of caste from this data is to
ignore the enormous differences in life fortunes and expectations
among the individuals who fall within any given population - differences not discussed in the UNDP report. For its part, however,
the very notion of a formal caste does not admit of these degrees of
informal differentiation; all members of the subordinated group are
forced to ride in the back of the bus, so to speak. The very fact of
significant variation in social success within groups is itself evidence
that some process far more complex than caste differentiation is
involved. There is little doubt that black professional women, for
example, earn far more than unskilled white male laborers do.
These distinctions in income within racial groups are largely attributable to the very broad categories of workers who are lumped together in a single class: the label accountant, for example, covers
both people who do simple audits and those who structure complex
24
financial transactions.
But even if we put that point aside, there is no reason to believe
that differences in economic or personal well-being are solely, or
even mostly, the result of social forces rather than individual effort.
In particular, it is wrong to say that any observed differences in
group achievement levels should be attributed as a matter of course
to social practices or institutional structures. In some instances the
differences might well be attributed to personal motivation, family
structure, hustle, and luck. At some point the consequences of individual failure should be laid at the feet of the individual who fails,
for if they are not, then the incentives for success are effectively
undermined. An ethic of personal responsibility is not meant solely
to point the finger at those who fail. Its prime objective is to give
individuals incentives to succeed so that no fingers need be pointed
at them after the fact. The willingness to create collective responsibility for individual failure has as its unfortunate consequence an
increase in the rate of failure. It is not possible to create the right
incentives for individual achievement by resorting only to carrots
but never to sticks, and it is not possible to get the right mix of
incentives by appealing to the idea of pervasive social discrimination as the source of lower economic and educational achievement
for some African Americans. Indeed, at least twenty years of agare around 0.90 for females and 0.86 for males, id. fig. 1.13, and these numbers surely understate the difference because they give more weight to the greater black male income than is
appropriate for any overall measure of individual well-being. It is hard to attribute these sex
differences to any form of racial discrimination.
24. See VICroR R. FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY 49-52 (1988)
(suggesting this analogy in an analysis of the "wage gap" between men and women).
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gressive enforcement of civil fights laws designed precisely to eliminate such social discrimination and "caste distinctions" has done
little to redress the worrisome trend in these statistics. 25 The
sources of the current social difficulties cannot be explained by a
simple appeal to the notion of caste.
Current social practices are also inconsistent with the idea that
African Americans are the victims of caste distinctions within this
country. Indeed, while African Americans are experiencing lower
levels of success by the standard economic measures, there is at the
same time a systematic set of programs, both public and private,
that discriminate in their favor on grounds of race. Many of the
public programs for affirmative action or diversity introduce explicit notions of caste by allowing African Americans certain advantages based on race that are denied to others. I am hard pressed to
identify any real caste system in the history of the world that has
had affirmative action programs for members of its disadvantaged
groups. The result is a rare juxtaposition of phenomena: declining
economic fortunes for African Americans at the same time that
there is a steady or increasing level of explicit legal advantages. It is
hard to see how a return to older principles of freedom of association and equality of all persons before the law could do much to
alter the situation for the worse.
The economic data on caste with respect to women is even more
suspicious. To look at the UNDP's report, one might think that
there was a major scandal brewing in the world. When the UNDP
breaks down its HDI by sex, it comes up with the bald - and false
categorical conclusion: "No country treats its women as well as
it treats its men."'26 To support this conclusion it takes the breakdown of its HDI by sex and notes that for the first-place country,
Sweden, the HDI is 0.977 overall and 0.921 for women, while for
the United States the comparable drop is from 0.976 to 0.824.27 It
should be quickly apparent that something is sadly amiss, because
the index measure states that the position of American women is
below that of the citizens of, among other countries, Trinidad and
Tobago and Estonia.28 In fact, the position of the average American woman is just below that of the average citizen of Poland and
25. See James J.Heckman & J. Hoult Verkerke, Racial Disparity and Employment Dis-

crimination Law: An Economic Perspective, 8 YALE L. & PoLY. Rev. 276, 276 (1990)
("[S]ince 1975, relative black economic status has not advanced and may have deteriorated
slightly.").
26. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 20, at 16 fig. 1.19.
27. Id.tbl. 1.3.
28. Id. at 135 tbl. 1.
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Georgia, both long under communist rule.29 Because the women in
these countries are clearly less well-off than the men, it seems that
the American woman is far worse off than the men of Romania and
Albania, although these numbers are mercifully not included in the
report.
Clearly there is something bizarre about this rank order, and it
is easy to see what it is. The UNDP report uses, ironically, a malecentered analytical methodology: to the extent that women match
up statistically "like men," the report sees them as successful. Yet
the report makes no effort to recognize the economic contributions
made disproportionately by women - contributions that are not
contained in its limited data set. While the UNDP report insists
that the lives of human beings are what is really at stake,30 its treatment of sex differences makes a mockery of that claim. Thus, in
looking at the breakdown by sex, it is clear that women outlive men
and the disparity is greater for blacks than it is for whites 31 and that female levels of literacy are higher as well. The UNDP
gives all females in the United States a rating of 103.0% in life expectancy - with 100% representing parity with men - and
101.6% in educational attainment.32 All the negative data then
come from the economic indicators on adjusted gross domestic
product, whereon American women rate at 48.7 relative to men's
100.3 3 Surely a moment's reflection shows that something is deeply
amiss. How can American women achieve at least parity on life
expectation and education if they have only half the income of
men?
What is missing in the report is any notion that family units engage in cooperative production and distribution, whereby women
invest more of their time in work in the home, for which they do
not receive any cash payment from a third-party source. This work
generates enormous amounts of imputed income, which the women
share with their husbands and families, just as husbands share their
market-based wealth with their wives and their families. There is a
pooling of income and gains from trade. A similar story has to be
told when the inquiry turns from wages to income from stocks and
29. Id.
30. See id. at iii.
31. See id. at 18 fig. 1.13. White American females have a life expectancy of somewhat
over 77 years, and for white American men, the figure is 75. For black females the life expectancy is somewhat over 72 years of age, and for black men, somewhat less than 69. Id.
32. Id. at 101 tbl. 1.1.
33. See id.
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bonds. I have not done any close work on the, subject, but information supplied by the New York Stock Exchange suggests that the
average male has a portfolio of about $13,500 in stock, while the
average female has a portfolio of little more than half that size, or
$7,200.34 But once again the raw data cry out for correction, for the
key question for social welfare is not who receives the dividend
checks but who spends the proceeds and to what ends. The same
kind of informal redistribution with the immediate - and extended
family that happens all the time with earned income happens
with investment income as well: there are massive amounts of redistribution within families that are not caught by the official exchange statistics. The problems, moreover, are complicated still
further by the complex patterns of survivorship rights that are applicable to substantial assets that are placed in pension or private
trusts. There are more widows than widowers in the United States,
and spousal protection usually ranks higher than the passage of
wealth onto the next generation in the eyes of most decedents. I
am in no position to conduct the detailed empirical study that is
necessary to determine the actual divisions and effective control of
wealth by sex in our society. But the educational and life expectancy figures surely provide some clue that this redistribution is
substantial, for it is difficult to understand how women could do so
well as a group by these output measures if they had so few inputs
to work with.
Unfortunately, the UNDP report makes no effort to capture any
of these effects, and every effort to ignore them, when it blandly
concludes as follows: "In industrial countries, gender discrimination (measured by the HDI) is mainly in employment and wages,
with women often getting less than two-thirds of the employment
opportunities and about half the earnings of men."'35 Even within
the paid sector, there is no effort to make adjustments to take into
account years of specialized education, years of experience, or
hours committed to the workplace. To give some idea of how misguided the UNDP figures are, the better studies on comparable
worth indicate that male-female differences when job classifications
are held constant are, at a maximum, ten to fifteen percent, and
even that gap disappears when marital status is taken into ac-

34. NYSE SHAREOWNERSHIP 14-15 (1990). Information provided by Bethann Ashfield,
New York Stock Exchange Library.
35. HUMAN DEVELOPMENr REPORT, supra note 20, at 16-17.
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count: 36 "Women who have never married have historically received wages roughly comparable to men's."37
The UNDP conclusions on the differential status of men and
women are, then, worse than worthless. They are positively misleading and downright mischievous. Moreover, for our mundane
purposes they do not advance the idea that women are a
subordinated caste by so much as a millimeter. Overall, there is
little mileage in the idea of using caste as a way to get at the social
and economic differences that are found among members of a society. Likewise, I think that there is little to be gained by seeking to
use the idea of caste to justify an antidiscrimination law that is
designed, not to eliminate formal barriers to association and exchange, but to override in its very conception the freedom of association that should lie at the heart of any rational liberal order.
II.

DISCRIMINATION AND SEXUAL PREFERENCE

The most vivid illustration of the arguments about caste arise in
the context of sexual preferences. At present there is a good deal
of litigation and dispute over the legal rights of gays and lesbians in
the United States. At one level the demands are for associational
freedom - that is, for the state to recognize and enforce same-sex
marriages on the same terms and conditions on which it recognizes
and enforces marriages between men and women. Here the concern is parallel to the formal restrictions on interracial marriages. It
is therefore quite proper to argue that these formal restrictions at
least raise the specter of caste differences between persons. But at
the same time there is an equal concern about extending the protection of the antidiscrimination norm in employment and housing, for
example, to gays and lesbians. In essence, the effort to remove formal barriers to gays and lesbians is accompanied by an attack on
the informal barriers as well.
The bundling of these two programs in the same package creates all sorts of tensions that are nicely brought to bear in the extraordinary judicial proceedings that have taken place in Colorado
over its recent popular constitutional referendum - Amendment
238 - preventing state and local governments from enacting antidiscrimination laws that would treat gays, lesbians, and bisexuals
36. See, e.g., ELLEN F. PAUL, EQUITY AND GENDER: THE COMPARABLE WORTH
DEBATE 16 (1989). She relies on studies by Paul Weiler. See Paul Weiler, The Wages of Sex:
The Uses and Limits of Comparable Worth, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1728, 1784 (1986).
37. PAUL, supra note 36, at 17; see also Weiler, supra note 36, at 1785.
38. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b.
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as classes protected from discrimination in employment and housing, or indeed from any form of discrimination. 39 The Colorado

Supreme Court recently struck down Amendment 2 on the grounds
that the state had not shown a compelling state interest to justify

by the
the amendment's infringement on the right of those affected
40

provision to participate equally in the political process.
In one sense, the decision invalidating Amendment 2 bears

some resemblance to one of the most important and controversial

decisions of the Warren Court, Reitman v. Mulkey.4 1 At issue in

that case was an amendment to the California Constitution passed
by referendum. The amendment provided:
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny,
limit or abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is
willing or who desire to sell, lease or rent any part of all of his real
property, to decline to sell, lease or rent such property to such person
or persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses. 42

The provision did not apply to real estate owned by the state.
In Reitman, the Court struck down the provision on the grounds

that by incorporating the provision into its constitution, the state
"authorized" the forms of discrimination that had previously been
prohibited under the Unruh and Rumford Acts, 43 which were necessarily overridden by the new constitutional provision. 44 As is typical in dubious constitutional decisions, the Court refused to find

that any dispositive test existed to demarcate state action from private action and instead announced that all depends on "sifting facts
39. The provision reads:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual Orientation. Neither
the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce
any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual
orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis
of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota
preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution
shall be in all respects self-executing.
COLO. CONSr. art. II, § 30b. The amendment clearly attacks bans on private discrimination
and appears to reach discrimination by the state as well. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270,
1284-85 & n.25 (Colo.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 419 (1993).
40. Evans v. Romer, Nos. 94SA48, 94SA128, 1994 Colo. LEXIS 779 (Oct. 11, 1994). The
court initially held that the amendment should receive strict scrutiny in Evans v. Romer, 854
P.2d 1270 (Colo)., cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 419 (1993).
41. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
42. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 26 (enacted 1964, repealed 1974) (enacting Proposition 14).
43. Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL. CiV. CODE § 51 (West 1982 & Supp. 1994); Rumford
Fair Housing Act, CAL Civ. CODE § 35720 (West 1973), repealed by Act of Sept. 19, 1980, ch.
992, 1980 Cal. Stat. 3166 (codified at CAL. GovT. CODE § 12955 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994)).
44. 387 U.S. at 376-77.
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and weighing circumstances. ' 4s But surely this idea of state authorization is extended so far as to be useless for making any decision.
Authorization normally connotes a situation in which one person
authorizes another to act on his behalf, so that the acts of the agent
are then sufficient to bind the principal. Yet this provision properly
exempted state property from its scope. 46 Moreover, even if the
state authorizes the autonomous acts of its own citizens through this
provision, which acts does it authorize - only those that involve
racial discrimination against preferred classes? Or those that discriminate in their favor? Or those decisions that purport to follow a
color-blind policy in selling or leasing? These policies are all diametrically at odds with one another, and it is far more accurate to
insist that the state authorizes none of them than to pretend that it
authorizes them all. The decisions to exclude or include are made
by the individuals in question. They are only enforced by the state,
which does not take a position as to their intrinsic desirability, any
more than it does when it solemnizes a marriage between two persons of the same race, neither of whom would on principle marry a
person of a different race. In my view, the initial provisions of the
Unruh and Rumford Acts should have been struck down as illicit
forms of state action that interfere with the liberty and property
rights of individuals, so that the corrective referendum should not
have been needed at all. But, as it was, Reitman followed the line
set originally by Shelley v. Kraemer47 and Barrows v. Jackson48 and
sought to obliterate the public-private distinction under a clause
that aimed to constitutionalize it.49
This constitutional tradition makes it difficult to think about the
wisdom of Amendment 2. In principle, the background rules
against which the soundness of the amendment is evaluated are critical to the inquiry. As I have argued, the proper background condition is one that allows all private individuals to choose the persons
with whom they wish to associate and deal. To say, therefore, that
any person can refuse to deal with gays or lesbians is not to say very
much at all. All individuals also have the right to refuse to deal
with heterosexuals or indeed any other subclass of the general pop45. 387 U.S. at 378 (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722

(1961)).
46. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 26 (repealed 1974). It also excludes innkeepers, who were at
common law subject to an antidiscrimination provision.
47. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
48. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
49. For my criticism of the Shelley line of cases, see Epstein, Standing Firm, supra note 4,
at 29-33.
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ulation. On this view, therefore, the amendment is quite simply unnecessary as it only confirms a set of rights that are already
universally held.
That simple approach will not do, however, in a world in which
the antidiscrimination norm is regarded as superior to the principle
of freedom of association. If the law now says that one cannot discriminate on the grounds of race, ethnic origin, sex, age, religion, or
disability, then why should it single out sexual orientation as an
area in which the ancient principle of freedom of association is allowed full sway against its two traditional antagonists: criminalization of the relationship and the antidiscrimination ordinance?
Viewed in this context, the very passage of the referendum could be
viewed as an effort to impose second-class citizenship on some persons for the benefit of others. Indeed, it was just this argument that
led the Colorado Supreme Court to insist that the amendment be
subjected to strict scrutiny,50 even after Bowers v. Hardwick5' apparently closed the door on any ordinary strict scrutiny attack on
equal protection grounds. 5 2 Thus the Colorado decisions stress that
what is at stake is not gay and lesbian relations as such but their
connection to participation in the political process:
Amendment 2 singles out that class of persons (namely gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals) who would benefit from laws barring discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. No other identifiable group
faces such a burden - no other group's ability to participate in the
political process is restricted and encumbered in a like manner....
In short, gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals are left out of the political process through the denial of having an "effective voice in the
governmental affairs which substantially affect their lives." Strict
scrutiny is thus required because the normal political processes no
longer operate to protect these persons. Rather, they, and they alone,
constitution in order to seek legislation which is
must amend the state
53
beneficial to them.
By this standard the amendment is surely dead on arrival. But the
question is why this standard should be applied at all. If Amendment 2 were confined to private parties alone, then in a world of
freedom of association, the amendment would be redundant and
unnecessary and the singling-out argument raised in the opinion
50. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1282 (Colo.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993).

51. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
52. See 478 U.S. at 190.
53. 854 P.2d at 1285 (quoting Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379-80 (1963)); see also
Evans v. Romer, Nos. 94SA48, 94SA128, 1994 Colo. LEXIS 779, at *5, *10 (Oct. 11, 1994).
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would fail.5 4 Precisely because association rights are accorded such
low status, the defenders of this amendment, at least as it is applied
to private parties, are now put to a cruel choice. In order to defend
part of the turf of freedom of association, they have to make it appear as though they harbor special animus against the groups that
want to claim the protection of the antidiscrimination ordinance. It
is no longer possible to argue simply that people should be able to
choose to associate with some individuals but not with others without giving learned reasons for their choice. Instead, proponents of
the amendment must give long and elaborate explanations as to
why some groups are unworthy, by some public standard, of a guarantee of the same level of protection that is accorded to other
groups. The net effect, therefore, is to invite both testimony and
rebuttal on the issue of whether homosexual conduct is or is not
immoral or whether it is or is not against the public interest. Moreover, it is to do so, not in open public debate, but in the context of
expert testimony in a courtroom setting - hardly the place to have
a sensible debate over any sensitive social issue.55 The inability to
rely on freedom of association means that all refusals to associate
have to be for cause, so that individuals and groups who wish to be
left alone now have to engage in the unhappy task of group defamation in order to achieve that rather simple end. The upshot is that
the entire process sanctions a level of antigay and antilesbian rhetoric that is better left unspoken in public settings.
Importing rhetoric of this sort into the political process can
hardly do anything to build the strong sense of mutual respect on
which political communities are supposed to rest. Indeed, there is
reason to believe that it can only make matters far worse. The
54. For what it is worth, this argument also seems wrong for another reason. All sorts of
people who are neither gay, lesbian, nor bisexual could, and did, oppose the amendment.

The disabilities created in the amendment are directed to one class, but the limitations on
participation in the political process are not.
55. For excerpts of this courtroom debate, see the testimony by John Finnis and Martha
Nussbaum, first for and then against the amendment. John Finnis & Martha Nussbaum, Is
Homosexual Conduct Wrong? A PhilosophicalExchange, NEw REPUaLIc, Nov. 15, 1993,

at 12. I venture no opinion on the accuracy of classical references, but Finnis's testimony
surely is fatal to his own cause insofar as it equates homosexual conduct with "all extramarital sexual gratification." Id. (citing Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle, Musonius, Rufus, and
Plutarch). Finnis just misunderstands the situation if he even thinks that the people who
supported Amendment 2 would extend it to unmarried couples living together, or even to

casual heterosexual contact. His condemnation of sex outside marriage sweeps far too
broadly for the occasion. In any event, this testimony is odd indeed because what is at stake
is an antidiscrimination ordinance that could be in place even after homosexual conduct is
decriminalized. Moreover, his argument that homoerotic culture should be discouraged because it is incompatible with true friendship, id., is an observation that does not need the
force of law behind it, even if it is true.
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traditional position of individualism has a great virtue insofar as it
does not link freedom of association to the endorsement of the
modem antidiscrimination principle of the civil rights laws. Today
it is too often assumed that the proposition that A has the right to
do X carries with it two distinct implications: first, that no one can
punish or sue A for having done X, and second, that no one can
discriminate against A in personal or business dealings for having
done X. For example, once we decide that people cannot be punished because they have once used drugs, then we have necessarily
decided that private employers and landlords cannot discriminate
against people for just these same reasons. Similarly, once we have
decided that homosexual conduct is not criminal, then we are necessarily committed to the proposition that employers and landlords
cannot discriminate against gays and lesbians in their private affairs;
nor, for that matter, can employers and landlords discriminate in
their favor.
The connection here is unfortunate because, among other
things, it encourages resistance to the first step - legalization and
recognition -

because of the fear that the second step

-

forced

association - will follow. For example, the question of the legality
of same-sex marriages has bullied its way to the front of the constitutional agenda.5 6 The arguments in favor of their legalization are
strong as a matter of political theory. The principle of freedom of
association is no weaker on matters of intimate association than it is
on matters of business association, and it may be stronger in the
sense that it can resist regulation even with compensation. But for
our purposes, the key point is that outsiders cannot point to their
own distaste for the practices, or to their strong religious convictions and objections, as public reasons to render these unions unlawful. Surely the principle of offense cannot be used to prevent
gay and lesbian couples from normalizing their relationships by

56. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (holding that a strict scrutiny standard
must be applied to determine whether the state prohibition against same-sex marriages

should stand). On this same question, see Jennifer L. Heeb, Comment, Homosexual Marriage, the ChangingAmerican Family, and the HeterosexualRight to Privacy,24 SETON HALL

L. REv. 347 (1993) (urging that the due process guarantees of privacy to different-sex couples
apply to same-sex couples as well). See also William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex
Marriage,79 VA. L. REv. 1419 (1993); Jennifer G. Brown, Competitive Federalism and the

Legislative Incentives to Recognize Same-Sex Marriage,68 S. CAL. L. REv. (forthcoming Mar.

1995) (arguing that competitive pressures for the business of these couples and their supporters will induce some states to break ranks and introduce these marriages, which then must be

recognized by other states under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution, U.S.
CONsT. art. IV, § 1).
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Once same-sex couples are allowed to use ordinary con-

tractual devices to help keep their relationships on an even keel, it
is hard to see why the state should be able to deny them the opportunity to introduce into their relationships the same level of permanence and stability that state sanctions give to marriages between
couples of different sexes. It follows that these married couples
should be allowed to participate on equal footing with other
couples in the benefits that the state confers on marriages: preferred status under immigration laws, 58 with guardianship arrange61
ments,59 under rent control laws, 60 and in the area of inheritance.
This last set of demands cannot, I believe, be opposed on the
ground that it is one thing for the state to suppress an arrangement
and quite another to require the state to place its stamp of approval
on the full arrangement, which is what legal recognition seems to
demand. 62 That question of conferring benefits means far less in
the state context given the state monopoly power over the relevant
set of licenses, so that the key question - at least for the supporters of a liberal state - is whether the state skews private preferences among various forms of associational freedom, which it surely
does when it gives one kind of sexual union a preferred position
that is systematically denied to another. The liberal and individualistic argument for same-sex marriages is thus quite powerful and is
similar to the argument against the barriers to marriages between
different races, which were removed when the Supreme Court de57. Often gay and lesbian couples have entered into contracts that spell out the division
of financial and personal responsibility and that require each partner to bear some responsibility for the welfare of the other. Understandings of that sort are usually a prerequisite for
treating the arrangement as "permanent" enough to qualify for the same types of benefits as
married couples receive. See Brown, supra note 56, for a list of local governments that award
same-sex benefit packages. Many private institutions, including the University of Chicago,
have same-sex benefit packages, as do many businesses, including Apple Computer.
58. For an example of the limitations placed on same-sex partners in the context of immigration, see Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119 (1980) (disallowing "immediate relative"
status to an Australian citizen in a same-sex union with an American citizen).
59. For an example of this benefit as extended to same-sex partners, see In re Guardianship of Sharon Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (allowing a same-sex partner
to be appointed guardian over the objections of the ward's parents).
60. For an example of the extension of this privileged status to same-sex partners, see
Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989) (allowing a gay partner to "inherit" a
rent-controlled apartment under a statute that permitted these rights to descend to members
of the decedent's "family"). One blissful way to avoid this problem would be to abolish rent
control, but only if it were abolished for all couples.
61. For an application of this principle in the same-sex context, see In re Estate of
Cooper, 564 N.Y.S.2d 684 (Sup. Ct. 1990), affd. sub nom. In re Cooper, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797
(App. Div. 1993) (disallowing a current partner's rights to inherit as a surviving spouse).
62. See Earl M. Maltz, Constitutional Protection for the Right to Marry: A Dissenting
View, 60 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 949, 955 (1992).
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dared antimiscegenation laws unconstitutional. 63 It should hardly
matter that there are lots of people who are deeply offended by
either kind of union or who regard them as violating every sacred
religious belief. They are not asked to participate in these unions,
and under the liberal theory they could not be required to enter any
associations whatsoever with people who choose to enter into them.
The challenge here is whether the case for homosexual rights
and same-sex marriages should leap two chasms with a single
bound. First, the associational freedom would be preserved and
given the same level of protection as other unions. But then the
usual protections of antidiscrimination laws would be imposed so
that persons in such relationships could not be the subject of discrimination in employment or housing. If that second step would
necessarily be taken, then suddenly there is a good reason to keep
homosexual relations illegal if the alternative is that a religious fundamentalist would have to lease an upstairs apartment to a gay
couple once their conduct is decriminalized or their marriage
solemnized.
It is, in my view, a far better world if the owner can keep and act
on his own religious and moral scruples on this issue, even if
learned academics and legislators are quite capable of proving that
his conclusions do not rest on any rational principles that are capable of articulation to nonbelievers. Religious and moral scruples
should never limit the freedom of association of gays and lesbians:
religious folks are not spared from having to tolerate offensive behavior any more than the remainder of the population is, and if
they have to put up with enforceable same-sex contracts short of
marriage and with the private recognition of these contracts,64 then
they have to accept the marriages as well. But by the same token,
these individuals should be entitled to rely on their own religious
and moral convictions, however flawed and imperfect others might
believe them to be, in ordering and organizing their own affairs. No
principle of community values should encourage either group to be
so confident in the soundness of its own moral precepts that it is
prepared to force them down the throats of those unfortunate and
uneducated enough to disagree with them. All sides should be entitled to the defensive use of their own beliefs under a principle of
free association. There is no reason to lurch from a world in which

63. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
64. See supra note 57.
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too little protection is conferred to homosexual individuals and
couples to a world in which they receive too much protection.
CONCLUSION

I think that some important social lessons can be learned from
the recent flirtation with caste as the generative principle behind
the antidiscrimination laws. The chief point concerns the relationship between legal prohibitions and social distinctions. It has long
been fashionable in legal and policy debates to decry the distinction
between de jure and de facto, between formal legal differences and
social imbalances. That popular attack, however, has its greatest
appeal after the legal barriers to associational freedom and political
participation are removed, not before. A sad realization often follows the removal of these barriers - the realization that social
cures are not quickly or easily achieved if only because differences
in living standards, occupational choices, cultural values, social status, and lifestyle survive the removal of legal barriers, and that
these differences prove more difficult to eradicate, even if their
eradication is desirable. But the situation looks markedly different
while the legal disabilities are still in place, for then it becomes
quite coherent, if not attractive, to assert that all that is asked for is
the removal of legal barriers to participation in various forms of
social and political life. Think of what we will no longer have: no
huge social programs that require massive tax increases or intrusive
regulatory schemes; no political gerrymandering; no special privileges; no social campaigns to decide which individuals or groups are
victims of past discrimination, which are the perpetrators of that
discrimination, and which are innocent bystanders caught in the
crossfire between warring political factions. The program seems to
promise great gains at little cost. It can be easily endorsed with
little more than simple justice as its guide.
The completed campaign for the abolition of Jim Crow and the
upcoming campaign for the recognition of same-sex marriages both
fall into this tradition. But they are in some ways very odd companions. Jim Crow is a legacy of slavery and domination that worked
havoc on the lives and fortunes of a group of individuals who were
excluded from formal participation in the political process. With
same-sex marriages, the prohibitions and restrictions are directed at
individuals who are often highly trained and successful, with good
economic prospects, a loud - if minority - voice in the political
process, and - paradoxically - a protected-class status under

some antidiscrimination laws. The demographics and positions of
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the two groups could hardly be more different, and it is doubtful
that any political alliance between them could be more than a
short-term convenience given these differences in social positions
and personal aspirations. Yet it is precisely because each group in
its own time targets legal disabilities that they can make a common
appeal. A good libertarian who believes that all persons have equal
capacity to make the associational choices that govern their own
lives has to support these campaigns. It hardly matters whether he
or she has any sympathy with the ends and aspirations of the individuals who are denied the ordinary incidents of full citizenship.
Once the legal disabilities have been removed, then we see the
emergence of an effort to analogize various economic and social
differences to the formal legal differences captured in the idea of
caste. It is just at this juncture that the modem civil rights movement makes its greatest blunders. The economic data in question
are often impossible to interpret, or are interpreted, if not misinterpreted, with an eye to magnify differences that either do not exist or
can be explained, at least in part, by differences in education, training, aptitudes, or inclinations. Even when some unjustified differences continue to persist, it is hard to identify them or to know
exactly what steps should be taken to counteract them. The constant refrain has been that irrational prejudice drives the key behaviors in employment and housing, so that all that need be done is to
make irrational behavior illegal. Would that it were so simple! The
number of cases of pure irrationality that leap out in practice is
small, especially in relation to the overall size of the social tensions
and conflicts. Reforms that are loudly trumpeted when passed are
utterly incapable of delivering on their oversized promises. The net
effect of an antidiscrimination law, therefore, is to introduce greater
cost and uncertainty into the process, to provoke evasive responses
by firms that fear entrapment by the law, and to create resentments
on the part of those who fear that the law has done too much or too
little to redress the perceived level of social imbalance. In a word,
the size of the pie shrinks while its distribution is scarcely improved.
These effects are, in my view, an inescapable consequence of
any philosophical outlook that conflates social and economic differences with formal legal barriers. What is needed, therefore, is a
sharp reversal of intellectual orientation. It is critical to defend the
freedom of association of all individuals. It is equally critical to
decouple the two fundamentally different questions that today are
lumped under the single banner of civil rights: civil capacity and
discrimination. Governments should concentrate on the protection
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of the former and abandon pursuit of the latter. In a society as
diverse as our own, any effort to impose a single standard of social
correctness on associational choice is bound to lead to endless
struggles over its proper articulation. It is a far better solution to
allow individuals to go their separate ways, secure in the knowledge
that they have the protection of the law behind them in pursuit of
their associational freedoms. That was the original message of civil
rights law, and that should be the message of the civil rights movement today.

